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THE UNFINISHED  BUSINESS
MARY  ANN  GLENDON
Over the two years it took them to draft  the  1948  Universal Declaration
of Human  Rights, the eighteen members  of the  U.N.'s first Human Rights
Commission had surprisingly  few  discussions of why  human beings have
rights  or why some rights  are  universal.'  After  the horrors  of two world
wars, the need for a minimal common standard of decency seemed evident.
One of the first tasks assigned to the new Commission chaired by Eleanor
Roosevelt  was  the  preparation  of an  "international  bill  of rights."  The
Commissioners, in haste to complete their work before  the deepening Cold
War  made  its  acceptance  by the  General  Assembly  impossible,  left  the
problem of foundations  for another day.
At the Commission's first  session in January  1947,  China's Peng-chun
Chang  and Lebanon's  Charles Malik did try to initiate a discussion of the
premises  on  which  such  a  document  might  be  based.2  Chang  was  a
Confucian philosopher and educator who had done post-graduate  work with
John Dewey, and Malik was a philosopher of science who had studied with
Alfred  North Whitehead  and Martin  Heidegger.  Their suggestions preci-
pitated the Commission's first argument.  The Yugoslav, French and English
delegates began to wrangle over the relation  between man and society.
Several  other  Commissioners  became  impatient  with  that  sort  of
discussion.  They just wanted to get on with the business at hand.  After a
time,  India's Hansa Mehta broke  in.  She was one of two women  on the
Commission, a pioneering  human rights activist, a crusader against British
colonialism, and an advocate  for women's equality.  She said, "We are here
to affirm  faith  in  fundamental  human  rights.  Whether  the human  person
comes  first or  the society, I do not think  we should discuss that problem
now.  We do not need to enter into this maze of ideology. '3
Charles Malik, who had been literally  called out of his Beirut classroom
and pressed  into public  service  by  the government  of newly independent
1.  For details of the framing of the Universal  Declaration,  see Mary Ann Glendon,
Rights  from Wrongs (forthcoming,  Random  House).
2.  Human Rights Commission, First Session, Summary Records (E/CN.4/SR.7  p. 4).
3.  Verbatim  Record,  from  The More Important  Speeches and Interventionsof  Charles
Malik (Papers of Charles  Malik, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division), p. 38.2  THE  AMERICAN  JOURNAL  OF  JURISPRUDENCE  (1999)
Lebanon,  had  not yet  perfected  the  suave  diplomatic  style  for  which  he
would later become  famous.  He rebuked Mrs. Mehta  as a professor of the
old school would chide a student, saying:  "Whatever you may say, Madam,
must have ideological  presuppositions,  and no matter how much you may
fight shy of them, they are there,  and you either hide them or you are brave
enough to bring them out in the open  and see them and criticize  them."
The Commission's  Chair,  Eleanor  Roosevelt,  quickly realized  that  the
group  would have to concentrate on specifics  if the project  was to stay on
course.  She  steered the discussion back to the problem  of organizing  the
group's  work  schedule.  Thereafter,  the  question of foundations  surfaced
only sporadically.  One such occasion  was the presentation of a discussion
draft  by the  Secretariat  of the U.N.  Human  Rights Division.  Australia's
Colonel Roy Hodgson demanded  to know what was the philosophy behind
the  paper:  "What  principles  did  they  adopt;  what  method  did  they
follow?"5  John  Humphrey,  the  Canadian  head  of  the  Human  Rights
Division, replied  that the draft "was  based on no philosophy whatsoever."
It was, he  said, merely  a collection  from  existing  constitutions  of "every
conceivable  right which the Drafting Committee might  want to discuss."
At the very end of the drafting process,  and without much discussion, the
Commissioners did make a statement about the basis of human rights in the
Preamble  to the 1948 Declaration.  The Preamble's opening line recites that
"recognition of the inherent  dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights
of all  members of the human family  is the foundation  of freedom, justice
and peace in the world."  The word "dignity" appears at so many key points
in the Declaration that many scholars believe it represents the Declaration's
ultimate value.  Louis Henkin puts it this way:  "Eschewing-in its quest for
universality-explicit  reliance  on Divine inspiration or on Natural  Rights,
the  Declaration  provided  the  idea  of  human  rights  with  a  universally
acceptable  foundation,  an ur  principle,  human dignity."7
But inquiring minds must ask what is this "dignity,"  and what is its basis?
Its proximate source is easy to locate.  The U.N. Charter professes "faith in
freedom  and democracy"  which,  according  to the Charter,  is  grounded  in
another "faith"--"in  the inherent  dignity of men  and  women."  That  is a
good  deal  of faith  for  a  document  that  eschews  divine  inspiration.  No
wonder  we  find  Nobel  laureate  Czeslaw  Milosz  musing  ruefully  about
4.  Ibid.,  44.
5.  Human Rights Commission, Drafting Committee, First Session (E/CN.4/AC. I/SR. I
p.5).
6.  Ibid.
7.  Louis Henkin, "The Ideals of Human Rights:  Ideology and Aspiration,  Reality and
Prospect,"  in Human Rights Policy (New York:  St. Martin's  Press, forthcoming).MARY ANN GLENDON
"those beautiful and deeply moving words which pertain to the old repertory
of the rights of man and the dignity of the person."8  Milosz continues, "I
wonder at  this phenomenon  because  maybe  underneath  there is  an  abyss.
After all,  these ideas  had their foundation  in religion,  and I am not  over-
optimistic  as  to  the  survival  of  religion  in  a  scientific-technological
civilization.  Notions  that  seemed  buried  forever  have  suddenly  been
resurrected.  But how long will they stay afloat if the bottom  is taken out?"
Milosz puts the question neatly as only a poet can.  Is the universal rights
idea  merely based on  a kind of existential  leap of faith?  Or does it have
some sturdier basis?
Such  questions  came  to  the  surface  when  the  Universal  Declaration
celebrated its fiftieth anniversary  in  1998  amidst a barrage of attacks upon
its aspiration  to  universality-mainly  in the name  of cultural  relativism.
Typically these assaults describe the Declaration as an attempt to universal-
ize a particular "Western" set of ideas and to impose them upon people who
were  under  colonial  rule  and  thus  not represented  in  its  creation.  The
human rights project is dismissed as an instrument of "cultural imperialism"
or "neo-colonialism."
An equally common  retort is that cultural  imperialism  is the cry  of the
world's worst rights violators.  That sort of response, however, is obviously
inadequate:  The allegations of cultural relativism and imperialism could be
hypocritical  or  ideologically  motivated,  but nevertheless  true.  I  propose
therefore  to take  the accusations seriously.
My  conclusions  are  as  follows:  (1) The  Universal  Declaration  was an
impressively,  though  imperfectly,  multicultural  document  when  it  was
adopted in  1948.  It cannot be dismissed as "Western."  (2) The framers  of
the Declaration did take account of the diversity of cultures by leaving room
for a legitimate pluralism in interpreting  and implementing  its open-ended
principles. (3)  The danger of human rights imperialism is real, but its source
is in the efforts of special interest groups  to commandeer  human rights for
their  own  purposes,  rather  than  in the  Declaration  itself. (4)  The  human
rights project  will rest on  shaky foundations  unless and until  philosophers
and statespersons collaborate on the business that the framers left unfinished.
1.  Is  THE  UNIVERSAL  DECLARATION  "WESTERN"?
Those  who  label  the  Universal  Declaration  "Western"  base  the  claim
mainly on two  facts: (1) many of the world's peoples, especially those still
living  under  colonial  rule,  were  not represented  in the United Nations  in
8.  Czeslaw  Milosz,  "The  Religious  Imagination  at  2000,"  New  Perspectives
Quarterly, Fall  1997,  32.4  THE  AMERICAN  JOURNAL  OF  JURISPRUDENCE  (1999)
1948,  and (2)  most of the Declaration's  rights first appeared  in European
and North  and  South American  documents.  Those statements  are correct,
but do they destroy the universality of the Declaration?
Contrary  to  what  is  often  suggested,  the  participation  by  developing
countries  in the  framing  of the Declaration  was by no  means negligible.9
At the U.N.'s founding conference  in San Francisco  in  1945, it was chiefly
the  smaller  or  less-developed  nations  who  were  responsible  for  the
prominent  position  of human  rights  in  the  U.N.  Charter.  Within  the
eighteen-member  Human Rights  Commission,  China's  Peng-chun  Chang,
Lebanon's  Charles  Malik,  the  Philippines'  Carlos  Romulo,  and  Chile's
Hemrnn  Santa Cruz were  among the most influential  and active  members.
It  is  sometimes  said  that  the  educational  backgrounds  or  professional
experiences  of widely traveled  men  like  Chang  and Malik  "westernized"
them,  but  their  performance  in  the Human  Rights  Commission  suggests
something rather different.  Not only did each contribute significant insights
from  his own  culture,  but each possessed an  exceptional  ability  to under-
stand other cultures, and to "translate" concepts from one frame of reference
to another.  Those skills, which can hardly be acquired  without substantial
exposure to traditions  other than one's own,  are indispensable for effective
cross-cultural  collaboration and were key to the adoption of the Declaration
without a single dissenting vote in  1948.
The  Declaration  itself was based on extensive  comparative  study.  The
first draft, prepared by the U.N. Secretariat, was accompanied by a 408-page
document  showing  the  relationship  of each  article  to  provisions  of  the
world's  existing  and  proposed  constitutions  and declarations.  When  the
Human Rights Commission's second draft was submitted to U.N. members
for comment, responses were received from a group of nations that included
Brazil, Egypt, India, Mexico,  and Pakistan, South Africa,  Sweden, and the
United  States.
Among  the  fifty-eight  Member  States represented  on the U.N.  General
Assembly's  committee  which reviewed  the near-final  draft  in the  fall  of
1948,  there  was  even  greater  cultural  and  ideological  diversity.  This
Committee  on  Social,  Cultural  and Humanitarian  Affairs  (known  as  the
Third Committee)'was chaired by Charles' Malik.  It included six members
from  Asia,  four from  the African  continent  (Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia,  and
South  Africa),  plus  the  large  Latin  American  contingent.  Six  of  the
"European"  members belonged to the Communist bloc; Islamic culture  was
strong in eleven; and four had large Buddhist populations. Over the course
of more than a hundred meetings, the members of this large committee went
9.  See also  Philip Alston, "The  Universal Declaration  at 35:  Western  and Pass6  or
Alive and  Universal?,"  International  Commission of  Jurists  Review 30  (1983)  60,  61; and
Johannes Morsink,  The  Universal Declaration of  Human  Rights:  Origins, Drafting, and
Intent (Philadelphia:  University  of Pennsylvania  Press,  1999),  especially  the  concise
summary of the drafting process in  pp.  1-12.MARY ANN GLENDON
over every  word  of the draft.  Each country's representatives  were  given,
and most of them enthusiastically seized, the opportunity to participate.
At  the  end  of  this  process,  Charles  Malik  could  justly  say  of  the
Universal Declaration that "All effective  cultures in the world had a creative
hand in the shaping of the document...."  As Malik put it, "The genesis of
each article,  and each part of each article, was a dynamic process in which
many minds, interests, backgrounds,  legal  systems and ideological persua-
sions played  their respective  determining roles.""
It  was,  of course,  true  that  much  of the  world's  population  was  not
represented  in  the  U.N.  in  1948.  Large  parts  of  Africa  and  Asia  in
particular remained under colonial rule.  The defeated Axis powers, Japan,
Germany,  and their  allies, were excluded.  On the other hand,  subsequent
actions by the non-represented countries suggest that cultural  "diversity" has
been  greatly  exaggerated  where  basic human  goods are  concerned.  Most
new nations adopted  constitutions resembling the Universal  Declaration as
soon  as  they  gained  independence.  Later,  nearly  all  of these  countries
ratified  the  two  1966  Covenants  based  on  the  Declaration.  In  1993,
virtually all countries in the world participated in the adoption of the Vienna
Human Rights Declaration,  which reaffirms  the Universal  Declaration.  It
is hard  to dismiss this overwhelming  endorsement  of the principles of the
Declaration  as a mere vestige of the colonial mentality.
It is unlikely that  any other political document  in history has ever drawn
from  such  diverse  sources,  or  received  the  same  worldwide,  sustained
consideration  and scrutiny as the Declaration underwent  over its two years
of preparation.  Despite  all  the wrangling  that  occurred  over  specifics,
moreover,  there  was  remarkably  little  disagreement  regarding  its  basic
substance.  At  every  stage,  even  the Communist bloc,  South  Africa,  and
Saudi Arabia voted in favor of most of the articles when they were taken up
one  by  one.  The  biggest  battles  were  political,  occasioned  by  Soviet
concerns to protect their national sovereignty.
But what of the second objection mentioned above-the fact that several
key  ideas  in  the  Declaration  were  initially  described  as  rights  in  early
modem  Europe?  On this point, the findings of a UNESCO philosophers'
committee  that  included  Jacques  Maritain  and  University  of  Chicago
philosopher  Richard  McKeon  are  instructive.  After  surveying  leading
philosophers  and  religious  thinkers  the  world  over,  the  UNESCO  group
discovered  to  its surprise  that  a  few  basic  practical  concepts  of humane
conduct  were  so  widely  shared  that they  "may be  viewed  as  implicit  in
man's nature  as a member of society.""  Freedom,  dignity, tolerance,  and
10.  Charles  Malik,  "Introduction,"  in  0.  Frederick  Nolde,  Free and Equal:  Human
Rights in Ecumenical Perspective(Geneva:  World Council of Churches,  1968),  12.
11.  Richard  P.  McKeon, "The  Philosophic  Bases and Material  Circumstances  of the
Rights of Man,"  in Human Rights:  Comments and Interpretations(New  York:  Columbia
University Press,  1949), 45.6  THE  AMERICAN  JOURNAL  OF  JURISPRUDENCE  (1999)
neighborliness,  they  found,  were  highly  prized  in  many  cultural  and
religious traditions.
Nevertheless, the elaboration of these concepts as "rights" was a relatively
modem,  and  European,  phenomenon.  So,  does that  give  human  rights  a
genetic taint that prevents them from being "universal"?  Surely, their origin
ought not to be decisive.  The question should be not who had the idea first,
but  whether  the  idea  is  a  good one;  not  where  the  idea  was  born,  but
whether it is conducive to human flourishing.  Moreover, if a legal-political
idea  originated  in  one  country  but was  widely  adopted  and  internalized
elsewhere,  for  how  long  and  in  what  sense  does  it  still  "belong"  to  its
country  of origin?  Do not  all vibrant,  living cultures  constantly  borrow
from  one another?
Consider the civil-law tradition which originated in ancient Rome.  That
tradition  was  in  1948,  and  remains,  the  most  widely  distributed  legal
tradition  in the world. 2  The form  and style of the Declaration  gives  it a
familial  resemblance,  not only  to rights  declarations  in many continental
European  constitutions,  but  to  the  constitutions  and  charters  that  had
appeared  or were  soon  to  appear  in  many  Latin  American,  African  and
Asian countries.  Does that make all these instruments Roman?  The French
Civil  Code of 1804  was  widely  copied  by newly  independent peoples  in
Latin America who admired its clarity and were inspired by its consolidation
of a Revolution which had abolished the old unequal statuses of feudalism.
Does that make the law of all those countries French?
And what does the term  "Western"  mean anyway, if it is more  than an
epithet?  The majority of the U.N.'s membership in  1948, perhaps as many
as thirty-seven  countries,  might have been described  as "Western"  in  the
sense of being influenced  by Judeo-Christian  traditions  and Enlightenment
thought.  But how much sense does it make to lump together under a single
label  a group that comprises Latin Americans,  North Americans,  East and
West Europeans, Australians and New Zealanders?  By the same token, such
broad  concepts  as "Asian"  or "Islamic"  values  are  not  very  informative,
given the great variety  within traditions."  As the Chinese member of the
first Human Rights Commission, P. C. Chang, observed long ago, "Cultural-
ly, there are many 'Easts'  and many 'Wests';  and they are by no means all
necessarily  irreconcilable.'1
4
12.  See, Mary Ann  Glendon,  Michael  Gordon, and  Christopher Osakwe,  Comparative
Legal Traditions, 2d  ed. (St. Paul, Minn.:  West,  1994),  58-62.
13.  See Amartya Sen's illuminating reflections on universality and pluralism, in  "Our
Culture, Their Culture,"  The New Republic, April  1, 1996,  27.
14.  P.  C.  Chang,  China at  the  Crossroads:  The  Chinese  Situation  in  Perspective
(London:  Evans,  1936),  124-25.MARY ANN GLENDON
2.  How CAN  THERE  BE  UNIVERSAL  RIGHTS  IN  DIVERSE  CULTURES?
Let us now turn to a more sophisticated version of the cultural-relativism
critique.  Assume that the UNESCO philosophers were right that a few basic
norms of decent human behavior  are very widely shared.  Even if that is so
at  a  general  level,  different  nations  and  cultures  attach  quite  different
weights  to  these  norms.  Moreover,  different  political  and  economic
conditions  affect  each nation's  ability to bring  human rights principles  to
life.  That being so, what sense does it make to speak of universality?
That version of the cultural-relativism  critique  rests on  a false  premise
shared by many rights activists and rights  skeptics alike.  It is the assump-
tion  that  universal  principles  must  be  implemented  in  the  same  way
everywhere.  The Declaration's framers, however,  never envisioned that its
"common  standard  of achievement"  would or should  produce  completely
uniform  practices.',  P.  C.  Chang  stressed  that point  in  his  9  December
1948 speech to  the General  Assembly  urging adoption  of the Declaration.
He  deplored  that colonial  powers had  tried  to impose  on  other peoples  a
standardized  way  of thinking  and  a  single  way  of life.  That  sort  of
uniformity  could only  be achieved,  he said, by  force or at the expense  of
truth.  It  could  never  last. 6  Chang  and  his  colleagues  on  the  Drafting
Committee  expected  the  Declaration's  rights  would  be  inculturated  in
various  ways,  and that  over  time the  corpus  of human  rights  would  be
enriched  by these varied  experiences.
The  framers  of  the  Universal  Declaration  also  knew  it  was  neither
possible nor desirable for the Declaration to be frozen  in time.  They never
claimed  to have produced  the last word on human rights.  They expected
that new rights would emerge  in the future as they had in the past, and that
old  rights  might  be  reformulated.  That  did  not  mean,  however,  that
interpretation  was up for grabs.  They tried to provide  the Declaration  with
safe  passage through  such  transitions  by giving  it an  interpretive  matrix:
freedom  and  solidarity,  linked  to  a  thick  concept  of personhood,  and
grounded  in dignity.
The  framers'  approach  was remembered  by at  least  one  distinguished
international  lawyer  on  the document's  thirty-fifth  anniversary  in  1983.
Philip Alston wrote on that occasion, "The Declaration  does not purport to
offer  a  single unified  conception  of the world as  it should be  nor does  it
purport to offer  some sort of comprehensive recipe for the attainment of an
ideal world.  Its purpose is rather the more modest one of proclaiming a set
of values  which are capable of giving some guidance  to modem  society in
15.  Jacques Maritain, "Introduction"  in Human Rights:  Comments and Interpretations,
UNESCO  ed.  (New York:  Wingate,  1949),  16.
16.  P.  C.  Chang's speech  may  be  found  in  U.N.  General  Assembly,  182d  Plenary
Session, December  10,  1948,  Summary Records, p.  895.8  THE  AMERICAN  JOURNAL  OF  JURISPRUDENCE  (1999)
choosing  among  a  wide  range  of alternative  policy  options."' 7   By  the
1970s,  however, the original understanding  of the Declaration  was largely
forgotten.  And  what oblivion  had not erased,  opportunism  was eroding.
The  abstentions  by  South  Africa  and  Saudi  Arabia  from  the  final  vote
approving  the Declaration had been early warnings of more  trouble ahead.
South  Africa  had  objected,  among  other  things,  to  the  word  "dignity,"
apparently  fearing  its  implications  for  the  apartheid  system  it  was  then
constructing.  And  Saudi  Arabia had  claimed  that  some of the so-called
universal rights, particularly the right to change one's religion,  were really
just "Western"  ideas.  In  1948, those were  isolated claims.  But no sooner
was the Declaration adopted than the Cold War antagonists pulled apart and
politicized its provisions.  That set the stage for further mischief.  In  1955,
the  charge  that  some  rights  represented  "Western"  neo-colonialism
resurfaced  with particular vehemence at the Bandung conference,  where the
"nonaligned"  nations  found  unity  of a  sort  in  shared  resentment  of the
dominance of a few rich and powerful  countries  in world affairs.
3.  THE  DECONSTRUCTON  DERBY
Over the  1960s  and  1970s, the Declaration's  framers, one by  one, were
departing from the world stage.  The U.N. grew into an elaborate bureaucra-
cy  with  more  than  50,000  employees.  Its  specialized  agencies  become
closely intertwined with the nongovernmental organizations that proliferated
as the international human rights movement gained ground in the 1960s and
1970s.  That movement in turn was deeply affected by the ideas about rights
that  predominated  in  the United  States  in those  days.'"  The  movement,
like the  Declaration  itself, attracted  many  persons  and  groups  who  were
more interested in harnessing its moral authority for their own ends than in
furthering  its original  purposes.
Another  important  development,  set  in  motion  by  the  Cold  War
antagonists, was the nearly universal habit of reading the Declaration in the
way that Americans read the Bill of Rights, that is, as a string of essentially
separate  guarantees.  Its  dignity-based  language  of  rights  began  to  be
displaced by the more simplistic kinds of rights talk that were  then making
great inroads on political discourse in the United States.  Several features of
that new, hyper-individualistic  dialect had the potential to wreak havoc with
the Declaration:  rights envisioned without individual or social responsibili-
ties; one's favorite  rights touted as absolute with others ignored;  the rights-
bearer imagined as radically autonomous and self-sufficient; the trivialization
of core freedoms by special  interests posing as new rights. 9
17.  Philip Alston, "The  Universal Declaration  at 35,"  60, 69.
18.  See  generally,  Mary Ann  Glendon, Rights Talk:  The Impoverishment of Political
Discourse  (New  York:  Free  Press,  1991)  (especially  Chapter  6);  Anthony  Lester,  "The
Overseas  Trade in the American  Bill of Rights,"  Columbia Law Review 88  (1988)  537.
19.  See generally,  Glendon, Rights Talk. On the need for care  in accepting new rights,MARY ANN GLENDON
Thus, ironically,  the charge of cultural  imperialism has more credibility
than  it  had  in  1948.  The  global  spread  of hyper-libertarian,  radically
individualistic,  sound-bite  rights  ideas  has  rendered  the  contemporary
international  human rights project more vulnerable to the label of "Western"
than the Declaration ever was. Launched as a commitment by the nations to
compete  in advancing  human freedom  and dignity, the Declaration  is now
in danger of becoming what its critics have always accused it of being-an
instrument of neo-colonialism!
For decades, the seamlessness of the Declaration  has been ignored by its
professed supporters as well as by its attackers.  By isolating each part from
its  place  in  the  overall  design,  the  now-common  misreading  of  the
Declaration promotes misunderstanding and facilitates misuse.  Nations and
interest groups ignore the provisions they find inconvenient and treat others
as trumps.  A major casualty  has been the Declaration's  insistence  on the
links between  freedom  and solidarity, just at a time when affluent  nations
seem increasingly to be washing their hands of poor countries and peoples.
For examples of deconstruction in operation,  one could do no better than
to eavesdrop on the rights babble of the big U.N. conferences of the 1990s.
At first glance, the U.N. might seem to be an unlikely forum for the pursuit
of law reform.  But  its agencies  and conferences  have attracted  numerous
special  interest  groups  whose  agendas  have  trouble  passing  muster  in
ordinary  domestic political processes.  Over the years, lobbyists of various
sorts have acquired considerable  influence in the U.N. bureaucracy,  whose
processes  are  even  less  transparent  than  those  of  U.S.  administrative
agencies.
Thus  was  the  stage  set  for  the  U.N.  and  its  conferences  to  become
offshore  manufacturing  sites where  the  least  popular  (or  least  avowable)
ideas  of  special  interest  groups  could  be  converted  into  "international
norms."  These norms, though technically lacking the status of fundamental
rights, could then be portrayed at home as universal standards, and imposed
on poor countries  as conditions for the receipt  of aid.
At  the  U.N.'s  1995  Women's  Conference  in  Beijing,  for  example,
strenuous  efforts  were  made  to  advance  a  new  human  rights  para-
digm-mainly by representatives from affluent countries.  In her speech to
a plenary  session on  the  second  day of the  conference,  U.S.  First  Lady
Hillary Rodham  Clinton  gave high visibility  to  a misleading  slogan.  "If
there is one message that echoes  forth from  this conference,"  she asserted,
"it is that human rights  are women's rights,  and women's rights are human
rights."2  The  statement was half true,  but only half true.  Human rights
do belong to everyone.  But not every right that has been granted to women
see Philip  Alston, "Conjuring  up New Rights:  A Proposal for Quality Control,"  American
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by  a particular  nation-state  has  gained  the status  of a human right.  The
slogan was mainly aimed at universalizing extreme, American-style abortion
rights in a world where few countries, if any, go as far as the United States
and China in permitting abortions of healthy, viable unborn children.
That  there  might be  some  such demolition  derby  in  the Declaration's
future  was foreseen  long ago by Richard McKeon.  McKeon realized what
every  lawyer  knows:  practical  agreements  such  as those  reached  by the
U.N.  member  states in  1948  are  achieved  only at  the  price  of a  certain
ambiguity.  The framers knew that the same generality that made agreement
possible,  rendered  the  document  vulnerable  to  misunderstanding  and
manipulation.  In his UNESCO  report,  McKeon pointed out that  different
understandings of the meanings of rights usually reflect  divergent concepts
of man  and of society  which  in  turn  cause  the persons  who  hold  those
understandings  to have  different  views of reality.  Thus, he predicted  that
"difficulties  will  be  discovered  in  the  suspicions,  suggested  by  these
differences,  concerning  the  tangential  uses  that  might  be  made  of  a
declaration  of human  rights  for  the  purpose  of advancing  special  inter-
ests."'  That was  a philosopher's  way of saying,  "Watch  out,  this whole
enterprise  could be hijacked!"
In sum, the human rights project, launched as a multicultural commitment
to compete in advancing freedom and dignity, is now in danger of becoming
what its enemies  and critics have always accused it of being-an instrument
of "Western"  cultural  imperialism.
That  irony  did  not  escape  the  attention  of  Calcutta-born,  Cambridge
economist, Amartya Sen.  In 1994, just before the U.N.'s Cairo Conference
on  Population  and  Development,  Sen  warned  in the New  York Review of
Books that  the developed nations were  exhibiting a dangerous  tendency  to
approach population issues with a mentality that "treats the people involved
not  as  reasonable  beings,  allies  faced  with  a  common  problem,  but  as
impulsive and uncontrolled  sources of great social harm, in need of strong
discipline."22  Sen,  who won the Nobel  Prize  for his works  on  inequality
and  world  hunger,  charged  that  international  policy  makers,  by  giving
priority to "family planning arrangements  in the Third World countries over
other  commitments  such  as  education  and  health  care,  produce  negative
effects  on people's  well-being  and  reduce their freedoms." 2 3  In  short, the
whole range of human rights of poor people is at risk when special interests
are dressed  up as universal rights.
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The good news is that as the U.N.  enters a period of austerity, the era of
big conferences  like Cairo and Beijing is probably  drawing to a close.  The
bad news is that the same economic pressures that are putting a damper on
huge international gatherings, however, may aggravate the danger of capture
of U.N.  agencies by well-financed special interests.  A case in point is CNN
founder Ted Turner's $1 billion "gift" to the U.N.  announced  in the fall  of
1997.  Many who look to the U.N.  for leadership  in humanitarian aid were
overjoyed when Mr. Turner  announced  that his donation  was to help  "the
poorest of the poor."" 2  Paid out in installments of $100  million  a year  for
ten  years,  this  infusion  of  funds  would  have  ranked  behind  the  annual
contributions  of only the U.S.,  Japan,  and Germany.
The news seemed too good to be true.  It was.  It soon appeared  that the
U.N.  would not have control over the funds.  Rather, its agencies would be
required to submit proposals for approval by a foundation headed by a man
Mr.  Turner  chose  because "he  thinks  as I do."'  The  man  designated to
have  the chief say  in allocating  the Turner  millions  is  former  U.S.  State
Department  official  Timothy  Wirth,  who spearheaded  the aggressive U.S.
population control agenda at the  1994 Cairo conference.  Wirth has been so
zealous  in advocating  population  control  that  he  has even praised China,
with its coercive  one-child-per-family  policy, for its "very,  very effective
high-investment  family  planning." 2 6   As  for  Mr.  Turner,  he  told  a
California  audience  in  1998  that  in the  post-Cold War  world,  "The  real
threat is no longer  an army marching on us, it's people infiltrating  us, you
know, people  that are starving. ' 27
As its details have unfolded,  Mr. Turner's  gesture looks less like a gift
and more like a take-over bid aimed at U.N.  agencies with privileged access
to vulnerable populations.  The next few years are thus likely to be a time
of testing for the U.N.  if its prestige and organizational  resources  are not to
be, literally,  for sale.
As memories  fade about why the nations of the world determined  after
World  War  fl  to  affirm  certain  basic  rights  as  universal,  efforts  to
deconstruct  the Universal  Declaration  and remake  it  nearer  to  the heart's
desire  of this  or  that  special  interest  group  will  continue.  Whether  the
relatively  rich  and  complex  vision  of  human  rights  in  the  Universal
Declaration  can  withstand  the  combined  stresses of aggressive  lobbying,
heightened national  and ethnic assertiveness,  and the powerful, ambiguous
forces  of globalization,  is impossible to foresee.  Not only U.N.  agencies,
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but the governments of several liberal democracies have become implicated
in  breaking  down  the  connections  among  its  indivisible  rights  and
deconstructing  its core principle,  human dignity.
4.  THE  CHALLENGE  OF HUMAN  RIGHTS
The  contest  for  control  of the  meaning  of the  Declaration  forcefully
reminds  us  that the  framers  of the Universal  Declaration  left  the  human
rights movement  with a problem.  As John Paul II put it in his Address to
the  Vatican  Diplomatic  Corps in  January  1989,  "[T]he  1948  Declaration
does not contain the anthropological  and moral bases for the human rights
that it proclaims."  How, then, can one handle the problem  of reconciling
tensions among the various rights, or the related problem of integrating new
rights from time to time?
Those  problems  are  serious,  and  have  led  some  thoughtful  persons  to
conclude  that  the  Declaration  is  hopelessly  incoherent.  The  late  Michel
Villey, for  example,  maintained  that, "Each of the so-called  human rights
is  the  negation  of  other  human  rights,  and  when  practiced  separately
generates  injustices."" 2  Alasdair  MacIntyre  argues  that  different  rights,
borrowed from different traditions, often rest on different,  and incommensu-
rable, moral premises.29
These  problems  were  not overlooked  by Maritain  and  his colleagues.
Maritain  noted  that,  "Where  difficulties  and  arguments  begin  is  in  the
determination  of the scale of values governing  the exercise  and  concrete
integration  of these various rights."3  The  Declaration,  he went on, would
need  some  "ultimate  value  whereon  those  rights  depend and  in  terms  of
which they are integrated by mutual limitations."  That value, explicitly set
forth  in the  Declaration,  is  human  dignity.  But  as  time  went on,  it has
become  painfully  apparent  that  dignity  possesses  no  more  immunity  to
hijacking than any other concept.  One need only think of current defenses
of active euthanasia in terms of "the right to die with dignity."  (There is no
end, it seems, of pseudo-rights that the stronger are eager to confer upon the
weaker whether the latter are  willing or not.)
The shift from nature to dignity in modem thinking about the foundations
of human rights  thus entails  a host of difficulties.  The common  secular
understandings  are  that  human  beings  have  dignity  because  they  are
autonomous beings  capable  of making  choices  (Kant),  or because  of the
sense of empathy  that most human beings feel  for other sentient creatures
(Rousseau).  But the  former  understanding  has alarming  implications  for
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persons  of diminished  capacity,  and  the latter  places  all  morality  on the
fragile basis of a transient feeling.  Most believers,  for their part, would say
that dignity is grounded in the fact that human beings are made in the image
and likeness of God, but that proposition  is unintelligible to nonbelievers.
Moreover, the path  from dignity to rights is not clear  and straight,  even
for believers.  Brian  Benestad has pointed out that the term "dignity of the
human person"  has two different  connotations in Christian teaching--"[it]
is both a given  and an  achievement or an  end to be gradually  realized."'"
The Catholic Catechism, he notes, begins its discussion of morality with this
quotation from Pope Leo the Great:  "Christian, recognize your dignity, and
now  that  you  share  in  God's  own  nature,  do  not  return  by  sin  to your
former  base  condition."  But if dignity  is a  quality  to  be  achieved  by
strenuous effort to overcome sin and practice virtue, then it is not altogether
clear that the dignity of the rights claimant  is an adequate basis for human
rights.  Not every rights claimant,  obviously, has made strenuous effort  to
overcome  sin.  From  a  Christian  point  of view,  the  resolution  of this
dilemma  may  be  that  human  rights  are  grounded  in  the  obligation  of
everyone to perfect one's own dignity which in turn obliges one to respect
the "given" spark of dignity of others whatever they may have done with it.
In other  words, it may be our own quest for dignity (individually  and as a
society)  that  requires  us  to refrain  from  inflicting  cruel  punishments  on
criminals,  or from  terminating  the  lives  of the unborn  and  others  whose
faculties are  undeveloped or dormant.
In that  light, the drafters  of the  U.N.  Charter  were prudent  to  say that
human rights rest upon a "faith"  in human dignity.  It would be a mistake,
however, to leap from that proposition to the notion that this faith is merely
an  act of will,  an arbitrary  choice.  All  in all, one may say of "dignity"  in
the Universal Declaration what Abraham Lincoln once said about "equality"
in the Declaration of Independence:  it is a hard nut to crack.  The framers
of the Universal Declaration  were far  from naive about the difficulties that
lay ahead.  That is evident  from many  statements  in which they acknowl-
edged  the priority  of culture  over  law.  Though Maritain  was not,  strictly
speaking,  a  framer,  he  said  it  best.  Whether  the  music  played  on  the
Declaration's  thirty  strings  will  be  "in  tune  with,  or  harmful  to, human
dignity,"  he wrote, will depend primarily  on the extent to which a "culture
of human dignity develops."' 32
If Maritain,  Eleanor  Roosevelt, Charles  Malik, Rend  Cassin and others
who  held this  view  were  right,  then  a  great  challenge  faces  the world's
religions,  for religion is at the heart of culture.  Ultimately it will be up to
the  religions  to  demonstrate  whether they are capable of motivating their
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followers to fulfill their own calling to perfect their own dignity,  and in so
doing to respect the dignity of fellow  members of the human family.3
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